AI COREREFERENCE FOUNDATION

STABLE PROFILE / 1.0.0

Common foundation for security auditability

Reference requirements, methods and evidence. Specification stability does not mean that a particular system has passed an audit.

English reading view of the same profile and control identifiers. The canonical versioned artifact is preserved; this translation does not create new requirements.

AC-C01

Subject, purpose and assessment boundaries

Requirement
Every assessment clearly defines the object, its capabilities, use, time scope and exclusions.
Applicability
Always.
Method
Compare the plan with available functions and select a representative sample. Justify each omitted area.
Evidence
Assessment plan, public snapshot identifier, list of capabilities and exclusions.
Pass criterion
The scope is unambiguous and no declared capability lacks an applicability decision.
Limitations
A scope description is not a security test. A public snapshot may not allow independent verification of an internal deployment.
AC-C02

Identity and access to protected functions

Requirement
Protected functions require documented user authentication; alternative login and recovery paths do not bypass required factors.
Applicability
When the system contains accounts or restricted functions.
Method
In an agreed environment, assess valid, invalid and recovery login paths, including required MFA.
Evidence
Sanitized test record with expected and actual states; no passwords, tokens or MFA secrets.
Pass criterion
All included paths follow the documented authentication policy.
Limitations
A successful login alone establishes neither secure password storage nor resilience against every attack.
AC-C03

Session lifetime and termination

Requirement
Sessions are validated on the trusted side and cannot be reused after termination.
Applicability
When the system uses user sessions.
Method
Check session change on login, termination and repetition of a protected request after logout.
Evidence
Scenario results with anonymized identifiers; a validity record without the token value.
Pass criterion
A terminated session has no further access, and limits match the declared policy.
Limitations
An unauthenticated public test does not cover every session management mechanism.
AC-C04

Authorization of functions, objects and fields

Requirement
A trusted application layer enforces permissions for the operation, data and exposed fields.
Applicability
Always; even a public system has a disclosure boundary.
Method
Build a role and operation matrix. Test both an allowed and a denied operation in each selected class.
Evidence
Sanitized matrix and records of negative and positive tests.
Pass criterion
The sample matches the matrix and client manipulation does not change authorization.
Limitations
An HTTP 401 response or a hidden button alone does not cover all authorization.
AC-C05

Minimization and protection of disclosed data

Requirement
Output contains only data permitted for the relevant audience; secrets and internal operational details remain separate.
Applicability
Always.
Method
Review the field allowlist and test negative samples containing sensitive values, including error responses.
Evidence
Public schema, redaction test results and description of disclosure boundaries.
Pass criterion
Unknown and prohibited fields do not reach public output.
Limitations
Redaction may reduce verifiability. Missing evidence must be acknowledged, not replaced with a claim of success.
AC-C06

Input and contract validation

Requirement
Types, sizes and logical input boundaries are validated on the trusted side.
Applicability
Interfaces accepting data.
Method
Submit permitted, missing, extra and boundary values within an approved test sample.
Evidence
Versioned contract and boundary test results.
Pass criterion
The valid sample is processed and the invalid sample rejected without a side effect.
Limitations
Valid syntax establishes neither input truth nor safe textual meaning.
AC-C07

Operation order, limits and repetition

Requirement
The process follows mandatory gates and limits; a repeated request does not cause an unintended second effect.
Applicability
When the system performs multi-stage or cost-incurring operations.
Method
In a safe environment, assess skipped steps, concurrency, repetition and limit exceedance.
Evidence
Record of state before and after the attempt, idempotency and the applied limit, without sensitive values.
Pass criterion
Gates cannot be skipped and the effect matches the declared repetition policy.
Limitations
This is an AI CORE operationalization; the ASVS reference alone does not prescribe a particular idempotency mechanism.
AC-C08

Evidence provenance and linkage

Requirement
Evidence has an identity, provenance, acquisition time and links to a control and subject; a derived output identifies its supporting material.
Applicability
Whenever a control result is presented.
Method
Select a sample of results and trace the chain from finding to observation and available artifact.
Evidence
Evidence manifest, originator type and links to sanitized artifacts.
Pass criterion
Links are traceable and do not silently substitute the supporting material or subject.
Limitations
A hash establishes byte equality, not the truth, independence or completeness of evidence.
AC-C09

Record retention and protection

Requirement
Relevant security events and results have defined retention, timestamps and protection against unauthorized modification.
Applicability
When audit or security records are created.
Method
Examine a selected record lifecycle, including access, correction and end of retention.
Evidence
Retention policy, sanitized timeline and evidence of protection.
Pass criterion
The record remains correlatable and changes or integrity limitations are explained.
Limitations
A public summary without internal evidence does not establish immutability of the entire store.
AC-C10

Safe failure

Requirement
An error does not bypass a protective gate, and a public response does not disclose sensitive internal information.
Applicability
Always.
Method
Simulate unavailable supporting material or a rejected dependency without interfering with live production.
Evidence
Expected and observed error states, with confirmation that the effect did not occur.
Pass criterion
The system follows its documented safe state and does not present an incomplete operation as successful.
Limitations
One simulation does not cover every possible failure.
AC-C11

Interpretation, independence and incompleteness

Requirement
A result distinguishes observation, operator statement and independent assessment, and identifies untested areas.
Applicability
Always.
Method
The assessor checks a sample of conclusions against the evidence and records their relationship to the operator.
Evidence
Sample scope, missing evidence list, assessor type and reasoning supporting the result.
Pass criterion
No conclusion exceeds available verification, and missing evidence is not labeled as success.
Limitations
Publishing a self-assessment does not create an independent audit.
AC-C12

Remediation and reassessment

Requirement
A finding has a correction and reassessment process; a newer result does not erase the earlier trail.
Applicability
When there are findings, changes or follow-up assessments.
Method
Select a remediated finding and compare the original scope with the new verification; do not present a planned fix as completed.
Evidence
Link to the previous record, remediation status and new evidence.
Pass criterion
A reader can distinguish an open finding, an implemented fix and a verified fix.
Limitations
This is not automatic confirmation of operational recovery.

AI CORE texts are its own operationalizations of selected requirements. Partial mapping is not a claim of full equivalence or endorsement by OWASP, NIST or W3C.

Profile license: CC BY-SA 4.0. Adaptations and methodological additions: AISYSTEMS s. r. o. Source attribution.